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JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT OF LEGAL RULES:
DUELING CANNONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vitalius Tunionis1
ABSTRACT
According to the traditional theory of judicial decision-making, legal
rules constrain judicial creativity because they entail an objectively
correct legal answer. Therefore, even if judges want to engage in
judicial legislation they are nonetheless constrained by legal rules.
This article argues that this understanding is flawed. First, the
selection effect ensures that most cases that reach international courts
revolve around uncertain legal rules. Second, various cannons of
construction will usually allow judges to ascertain several equally
plausible legal rules; judges are likely to select those rules which
favor their preferred outcome of the case; and their preferred
outcome will be largely based on non-legalistic grounds, such as
fairness or specific policy preferences. None of this means that legal
rules are worthless. It does mean, however, that the traditional theory
of judicial decision-making overrates the importance of legal rules as
a possible check on judicial creativity.
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DUELING CANNONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Judicial Creativity and Constraint of Legal Rules
In recent decades international law has expanded noticeably
in scope and international courts have dramatically expanded in
number.2 Naturally, judicial accountability has become a subject of
debate. The prevailing view suggests that legal rules constrain
judicial creativity. Thus, the traditional theory of judicial decision-
making "entails the beliefs that law is 'rules'; that these rules are
'neutral'; that the judiciary is 'objective'; and that its prime task is to
'apply' rather than to 'make' the rules." 3 An interrelated view is that
legal rules normally have a single and clear meaning. Therefore, it is
only natural to expect that there is an objectively correct legal answer
to any legal issue presented in a case. Some international tribunals
have gone even further by asserting that judicial decision-making is
no different from mathematical sciences. 4
This article argues that such views are misguided and legal
rules in public international law, because of their ambiguity, will
rarely constrain international courts. Most of the ambiguity is due to
the rules for figuring out rules, such as canons of treaty interpretation
or methods and techniques for ascertaining customary rules. Karl
2 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 709 (1999) ("When future
international legal scholars look back at international law and organizations at the
end of the twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous expansion and
transformation of the international judiciary as the single most important
development of the post-Cold War age.").
See Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial
Process, 17 INT'L& CoMP. L.Q. 58, 58 (1968).
4 Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company, Ltd v. US, 6
RIAA 112, 114-115 (9 November 1923) ("International law, as well as domestic
law, may not contain, and generally does not contain, express rules decisive of
particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of
opposing rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision of law,
the corollaries of general principles, and so to find - exactly as in the mathematical
sciences - the solution of the problem. This is the method of jurisprudence; it is the
method by which the law has been gradually evolved in every country resulting in
the definition and settlement of legal relations as well between States as between
private individuals." (emphasis added)).
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Llewellyn used the fencing metaphor - "thrust" and "parry" of
dueling cannons - to illustrate the ambiguity of legal rules in the
American law. According to Llewellyn, for every canon of interpre-
tation that said one thing, there was a "dueling" canon that said just
the opposite.5 For example, one canon of interpretation may provide
that later statutes supersede the earlier ones; yet, it might be canceled
out by another canon of interpretation like the canon of in pari
nateria-statutes dealing with the same subject should be interpreted
so as to be consistent with each other. Accordingly, legal rules and
principles are "in the habit of hunting in pairs." 6 Such dueling
cannons will usually allow judges to justify almost any position they
adopt.7 This article likewise argues that various cannons of interna-
tional law are inherently ambiguous and legal rules in public interna-
tional law will seldom lead to an objectively correct legal answer.
Thus, the idea that legal rules constrain the judicial creativity of
international courts is based on a misconception.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35
(1960).
6 Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 38 YALE L.J. 405, 406 (1929).
Llewellyn's assault on the idea that legal rules can act as a constraint was part of a
larger legal realist movement that arose in 1920s and 1930s as a reaction to legal
formalism. For legal formalists, judging is a rule-bound activity and there is an
objectively correct legal answer; some formalists consider legal rules to be the
beginning and the ending - Alpha and Omega - of judicial decision-making. In
contrast, legal realists espoused a two-pronged thesis. First, legal rules are not the
only things that determine actual judicial decisions. Judges usually make up their
mind even before they turn to legal rules; the preferred outcome is usually based on
some non-legalistic grounds - conceptions of justice, attributes of litigating parties
(government, poor plaintiff, racial group, etc), ideology, public policy preferences,
and the like. Some realists like Jerome Frank went even further and asserted that a
judge's personality plays much more important role than legal rules. Second, judges
usually will find justification in legal rules for their preferred outcome. This is
possible because the legal system is complex and often contradictory. Occasionally a
judge will come across a preferred outcome that just "won't write", but these are
rare. See generally Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1138 (1999); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 138 (2009); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274
(1929); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 101 (1930).
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B. The Selection Effect
The selection effect, one of the concepts developed in
economic analysis of law, suggests that judicial disputes, and
especially disputes settled in higher courts, are not typical disputes.8
Most disputes will be settled even before any lawsuit is filed. In
domestic and international litigation, there are many incentives to
settle a dispute before it reaches a court. For example, an individual
or a State would be foolish to litigate a dispute where the odds are
clearly stacked against it.
Accordingly, whenever a case reaches a court, it is likely that
both parties feel that legal rules provide at least some chance of
success. Thus, cases that reach courts are seldom those where the law
is clearly in favor of one side. In a sense, parties pre-select those
disputes that revolve around ambiguous rules or ambiguous facts.
Therefore, easy cases - i.e., those that revolve around straightfor-
ward legal rules - are settled out of court and courts are more likely
to deal with hard cases. The selection effect opens up more the higher
one goes. Most straightforward cases are seldom appealed precisely
because the case probably revolves around clear statutory language
or strong precedent. Thus, the higher the level, "the weaker the tug of
legalism." 9
The selection effect is likely to operate more powerfully in
international courts because States usually have stronger incentives
to settle out of court. First, inter-State litigation is very expensive.
Costs of litigation in virtually all international tribunals are
prohibitively high for developing countries.1 0 Second, reputational
8 See generally George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection
Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990).
9 RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, 45 (2008).
10 AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 96 (2005) (A relatively insignificant case in the World Trade
Organization would require at least $500,000 to cover legal representation costs;
costs in high profile cases are well over $10 million.); see also Luis Ignacio Sdnchez
Rodriguez and Ana Gemma L6pez Martin, THE TRAVAILS OF POOR COUNTRIES IN
GAINING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 81-102 (Carlos Jim6nez
Piernas ed., 2007).
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costs for States in international affairs usually count more heavily
than for individuals or corporations in domestic litigation. Third,
States usually conduct extensive diplomatic negotiations before a
case reaches an international court. Thus, both parties must think that
there is a reasonable chance of success for both of them.
Of course, none of this means that international courts never
deal with easy cases or cases that revolve around clear-cut legal rules.
It does mean, however, that international courts are at higher risk of
chronically facing hard cases-cases where several legal answers
become equally plausible and thus enable more judicial creativity.
C. Types of Legal Rules in Public International Law
Although this might be a contentious issue in the higher
realm of legal theory, but overall most commentators agree that that
there are four types of legal rules in public international law: (1) trea-
ties, (2) customary law, (3) general principles of law, and (4) prece-
dents. These are stipulated in the Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ"),11 and it is widely
acknowledged that this article reflects legal rules of general interna-
tional law and not just those that the ICJ applies.12
111945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs 38(1),T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Id.
[hereinafter ICJ Article 38].
12 JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS56 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963) (This is the "text of the highest authority, and we may fairly assume that it
expresses the duty of any tribunal which is called upon to administer international
law."). Schwarzenberger went even further by asserting that "the near-universality"
of Article 38 transformed it into "a certainty - of the exclusive character of three
law-creating processes in international law." GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE
INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1965).
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II. PRECEDENT
A. The Notion and the Influence of the Precedent
Judging from the statutes of international courts, precedent
seems relatively unimportant. Yet, such an inference is wrong
because precedent's binding force reveals little about its actual
influence. 13 Lord McNair observed some time ago that expanding
jurisprudence of the ICJ "completely transformed the international
corpus juris from a system that rested very largely upon textbooks
and diplomatic dispatches into a body of hard law, resembling the
common law."14
Yet, while it is true that precedent has taken over judicial
opinions, the question remains whether it acts as a real constraint on
judicial creativity or is used only as a justification for decisions made
on other grounds. For one, the notions of precedent and judicial
constraint sit uneasy together: the first precedent must be based on
something else than a precedent, and that something else is usually a
good dose of judicial law-making. But even if we assume that the first
precedent was based on faithful interpretation of a treaty or geomet-
rically precise ascertainment of customary law, the view that prece-
dent can constrain would be still troublesome.
In general, the underlying idea behind precedent is that the
court should make the same decision as it had made in the previous
case. This is recognized as a fundamental principle in almost all legal
traditions. However, this seemingly simple idea gives birth to plenty
13 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
14 ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 16
(1954), quoted in MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT
15 (1996). John Jackson, the leading legal scholar of the WTO, similarly noticed the
prevalence of the precedent in the WTO: "Now, in the WTO, we see precedent being
used, no matter how you call it." John H. Jackson, Comment, Process and Procedure
in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT'L. L. J. 233, 239 (2009). See also David
Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 398 (1998); Raj Bhala, Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis
in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873
(2000-2001); Adrian Chua, The Precedential Effect of WTO Panel and Appellate
Body Reports, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 45 (1998).
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of complications. First, it is unclear whether international courts are
legally obliged to follow their previous decisions. Second, it is
unclear how one should determine whether the current case is the
same or similar to the previous one. Finally, courts can openly depart
from their previous decisions under certain exceptions, and this is
true even in jurisdictions where the courts are legally obliged to
follow their previous decisions.
B. Precedential Systems
In general, there are two principal systems of precedent.15
First, a system may allow judges to consider their previous decisions
but without legal obligation to do so. Second, a legal system may
oblige judges to decide the case in the same way as the previous case.
Some systems of the latter force judges to decide the same way, even
if there are good reasons to do otherwise; most systems, however,
usually permit some departure from the previous case if there is a
good reason doing so.
1. Legal Obligation to Follow
In general, legally binding precedent is distinguished from
persuasive precedent: legally binding precedent requires that courts
follow the precedent even if they are not persuaded by its rationale.
The notion of legally binding precedent is sometimes referred to as
the "content independent authority" - the precedent is followed
because of its authority or status, not because of its persuasive
content.16 Persuasive precedent, as the name implies, operates by
offering cogent reasons for the later judges who might want to follow
it. Some legal systems have historically imposed a legal obligation to
follow previous decision.17 The idea is expressed in the concept of
15 See generally RUPERT CROSS and J. W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN THE ENGLISH LAW 4
(4th ed., 1991).
16 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
7 In domestic legal systems, there are two aspects of legally binding precedent:
vertical and horizontal. Vertical aspect requires lower courts to follow the decisions
of the higher courts. The vertical precedent is irrelevant to most inter-state tribunals,
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stare decisis: stare decisis et non quieta movere-"to stand by decisions
and not disturb the undisturbed." The underlying reasons for this
legal doctrine are stability and predictability. The doctrine of stare
decisis apparently became firmly established only in the beginning of
the nineteenth century.1 8
It would be difficult to sustain the view that statutes of
international courts embody stare decisis doctrine. For example, the
ICJ seems to rule out any possibility of precedent, not to mention
stare decisis. Article 59, one of the most reviled articles in the whole
Statute, states that, "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." 19
On the other hand one could argue that Article 59 applies to
the dispositif of a judgment and has nothing to do with the stare
decisis. But overall, whatever merits of such proposition, one could
hardly find a single authority claiming that the doctrine of stare decisis
applies to international courts. As one commentator noted, the
doctrine of legally binding precedent simply "was not part of the
thinking on which the Court was constructed."20 However, just
because the Statute does not embody the doctrine of binding
precedent, it does not automatically mean that it discards any idea of
precedent.
2. Permission to Follow
If the Statute of the ICJ (not necessarily Article 59) rules out
stare decisis, does this mean that other models of precedent are also
excluded? Arguing this position would be as radical as arguing that
the Statute supports stare decisis. First, Article 59 was probably
inserted out of abundant caution.21 Second, refuting the literal
interpretation of Article 59 is possible by arguing ad absurdum: Article
with a limited exception of the WTO. Horizontal aspect requires the court to follow
its own previous decisions or decisions of the court on a similar rank.
" See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999).
19 ICJ Article 38, supra note 11.
20 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 105 (Cambridge
Ed., 1996).
21 Hersch Lauterpacht, The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of
Thought in International Law, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 31, 58 (1931).
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38 (1) d states that the Court can apply all judicial decisions " as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law," but Article
59 states only that the "decision of the Court has no binding force" -
so the Court could not follow its own decisions but could follow
those of other courts. This is an obviously absurd proposition.22
Third, as the Permanent Court of the International Justice (PCIJ)
noted in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, "[t]he object of
[Article 591 is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by the
Court in a particular case from being binding upon other States or in
other disputes".23 Again, Article 59 applies only to dispositif.
So what models of precedent are left to international courts?
In the absence of the doctrine of legally binding precedent, the courts
could follow the European consistent jurisprudence model
("jurisprudence constante"). According to this model, the courts are not
bound by their first case; instead, they can wait until a consistent
pattern emerges from many cases and such an approach is essentially
a process of trial and error. 24 However, it seems that this is not the
precedential model that international courts embrace: the ICJ and
other courts rarely wait until the practice accumulates and consistent
patterns emerge; usually they refer to a previous decision even if it is
the only one.25
Arguably, the precedential model that the ICJ and other
courts follow is simply that of persuasive precedent. Persuasive
precedent refers to any previous case, even not necessarily by the
same court, which is not binding in the present case but guides
judges in the present case. For example, in the Cameroon v. Nigeria
case, the ICJ stated that "[tihe real question is whether, in this case,
there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusion of earlier
22 SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 100-101.
23 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 7 (May 25). See also SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 63 ("Article 59 is
concerned to ensure that a decision, qua decision, binds only the parties to the
particular case; but this does not prevent the decision from being treated in a later
case as 'a statement of what the Court regarded as the correct legal position.").
24 A. L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q.R. 40, 42
(1934).
25 SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 11.
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cases." 26 Essentially, the ICJ says that if it can be swayed by better
reasons, it will follow better reasons and not the precedent.
C. Why International Courts Follow Precedents
If international courts do not have to follow their previous
decisions, why might they still want to justify their decisions with
precedential reasoning? As Justice Louis Brandeis once observed,
precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right."27 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht likewise noted that
certainty and stability ensure the sound administration of justice. 28 So
legal systems place a high premium on legal certainty, and the role of
the precedent is to ensure that certainty, or at least provide its
illusion.
However, this does not explain why it is in the interest of
courts to ensure that certainty, or at least its illusion, even when the
legal system does not require them to follow the precedents. The
agency model can explain this conundrum. According to this model,
developed in economic analysis of law, a principal hires an agent to
do a job that the principal does not want to do, cannot do, or the
26 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 275, 292 (11 June 1998).
27 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
28 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 14 (London, 1958):
The Court follows its own decisions for the same reasons for
which all courts - whether bound by the doctrine of precedent or
not - do so, namely, because such decisions are a repository of
legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because they
embody what the Court has considered in the past to be good law;
because respect for decisions given in the past makes for certainty
and stability, which are of the essence of the orderly
administration of justice; and (a minor and not invariably accurate
consideration) because judges are naturally reluctant, in the
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, to admit that they
were previously in the wrong.
Id.
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agent can do better and cheaper.29 Judicial agency is one example of
agency relationship: a government establishes its domestic courts or
sovereign States establish international courts to apply legal rules
and solve legal disputes. Yet, the agent might stray from the
principal's directions, for example, by basing judicial decisions not on
legal rules but on personal preferences or idiosyncratic policy
principles. 30 The problem of judicial agency becomes more
pronounced the less control the principal has over the agent.
Both the principal and the agent are interested in minimizing
the costs of the agency relationship. "Following" precedent is an
extra cost for courts and could constrain their natural inclination for
judicial creativity. Thus, strict conformity to precedent can be
considered an unnecessary cost. So we should expect that courts
would expend resources on precedential conformity only if there
would be strong incentives. However, in the agency model, it is not
only in the interest of the principal to measure the performance of the
agent, but also in the interest of the agent to assure the principal that
the standards are obeyed. Accordingly, conforming to precedent is
the necessary agency cost that courts pay. On the surface at least, if
international courts are strictly relying on their previous cases, it
must mean that they are following the mandate - only applying
legal rules and not working at judicial legislation.
D. The Selection Effect and Reasoning from Analogy
Most legal scholars rarely distinguish between precedential
and analogical reasoning. The difference, although subtle, is
important.31 Precedential reasoning deals with the court's obligation
to reach the same result in resolving the same issue. Precedent leaves
no choice. In analogical reasoning, the issue is similar but not the
same. Therefore, precedent constrains, analogy persuades. The
difference between precedential and analogical reasoning can be
shown schematically:
29 See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST 87-99 (2007).
30 Posner, supra note 9, at 126.
31 See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
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Reasoning from precedent:
Case I (precedent) has properties a, b, c, d, e > the Court made decision
X
Case II (new case) has properties a, b, e, m, s > the Court should decide
X
Reasoning from analogy:
Case I (previous case - the source of a, b, c, d, e > the Court made decision
analogy) has properties X
Case II (new case - the target of a, b, e, m, s > the Court should decide
analogy) has properties X
Reasoning from analogy obviously calls for a great deal of
judicial discretion -it is the judge who decides whether the similarity
between the source of analogy and the target is sufficient to extend
the holding of the original case to the new situation. Understandably,
not all legal systems have been fond of reasoning from analogy. In
Roman law for example, Justinian's Codex prohibited reasoning from
analogy: non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est.32 However, at least in
the common law tradition, reasoning from analogy is the basic
pattern of legal reasoning.33
Moreover, most cases that reach international courts seldom
require precedential reasoning proper; more likely, they call for
reasoning from analogy. This is again due to the selection effect:
States are seldom willing to litigate a case where the clear precedent
exists. Naturally, analogical reasoning dominates international
courts. On the other hand, precedential reasoning may serve perhaps
equally important function (if not more important) by clearing up
most disputes before they become judicial disputes.
32 See Gerald J. Postema, A Similibus ad Similia: Analogical Thinking in Law, in
COMMON LAW THEORY 102-133 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
3 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (rev. ed., 1962).
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E. Ratio Decidendi: Determining the Similarity of the Previous
Case & Distinguishing It
There is the persistent question of how exactly the judge
should determine the similarity to the previous case. Traditionally,
the answer has been that the ratio decidendi of the previous case
determines similarity. How can the judge determine the ratio
decidendi - the rationale of the previous case?
Not all legal reasoning in the previous case is ratio decidendi;
reasoning that was not necessary to reach the decision is obiter dictum
and courts are free to disregard dicta. There is some question about
whether the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum
applies to international courts because there is no doctrine of stare
decisis.34 However, at least in the case of other tribunals, the ICJ
apparently acknowledges the concept of obiter dictum.35
There are several schools of thought on how the judges
should determine ratio decidendi.36 One way is to connect the facts
with the outcome; a slight variation of this approach emphasizes
connecting only material facts with the outcome and necessary
reasoning.
The rule model of ratio decidendi looks at the actual words
used in the previous decision to explain and justify its holding. In
essence, the words that the Court used in the previous case serve like
the written text of the statute. Those who are concerned with dangers
of judicial creativity favor this approach. One version of this
34 Judge Anzilotti, for one, argued that distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter
dicta is unnecessary in international law: "The grounds of a judgment are simply
logical arguments, the aim of which is to lead up to the formulation of what the law
is in the case in question. And for this purpose there is no need to distinguish
between essential and non-essential grounds, a more or less arbitrary distinction
which rests on no solid basis and which can only be regarded as an inaccurate way of
expressing the different degree of importance which the various grounds of a
judgment may possess for the interpretation of its operative part." Factory at
Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No 13, at 24 (Interpretation, Dec. 16)
(dissenting opinion by Judge Anzilotti).
" SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 152.
36 See generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40
YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987);
James Louis Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587 (1957);
A. W. B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 21 MOD. L. REV. 155 (1958).
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approach was applied in English law, but was eventually abandoned
in the second part of the twentieth century.37 It required that courts
adhere to precedents rigidly by literally following the holding of the
previous case (i.e., they could not paraphrase previous case or loosen
up its language). That way, courts showed that they were not
creating new law but merely following established precedents.
Not only was it difficult to determine the similarity between
the present and previous case, but it is also relatively difficult to
distinguish the two. These are two sides of the same coin. Courts can
usually distinguish a new case even if the ratio decidendi of the old
case fits the rule model. One method international courts employ is to
claim that the present case on its face should follow the precedent,
but the principle of the previous case has been "qualified by later
legal developments."3 8 Likewise, international courts may state that
the principle does not apply because the circumstances of the new
case are significantly different.39
F. Departing
Even when international courts come across cases that they
cannot distinguish from the precedent, they are often able to depart
from it openly. This is especially pronounced in some regional courts,
where they can depart from a previous decision even without giving
any reasons for doing So. 4 0 Most international courts, however, feel
compelled to provide some reason for departure. Thus, the
Permanent Court of International Justice stated early on "the Court
has in practice been careful not to reverse precedents established by
itself in previous judgments and opinions, and to explain apparent
departures from such precedents."41
Even common law courts of the highest rank feel free to
depart from precedent whenever they find good reason.42 Likewise,
37 See Posner, supra note 9, at 154-155.
SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 115.
39 d.
40 Id at 131.
41 Id. at 129.
42 For example, the United States Supreme Court observed "when convinced of
former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In
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the quasi-official theory of international courts admits that the courts
will depart from their previous cases when the original decision was
wrong in the first place or that it no longer corresponds to the
requirements of the international community. 43
Understandably, instances of open departure are rare. This is
because when such a need arises in an individual case, the courts are
usually able to distinguish the case without discarding the precedent.
When the courts do depart, it is mostly because they want to establish
the legal certainty of the new legal rules.
G. Summary: Precedent as Constraint
So what is the constraining potential of precedent? As this
section has shown, it is apparent that precedent's constraining power
is more illusory than real.
First, international judges may openly state that they do not
care about the precedent because there is no statutory obligation to
follow previous cases. But that would be a very poor strategy,
because the judicial agency model predicts that the courts themselves
will want to create an impression of legal certainty. This is a
necessary agency cost for international courts, and the doctrine of
legal precedent serves this function very well.
Second, although judges want to reinforce the impression of
legal certainty, they do not want to be constrained by it. Rigid
conformity to precedent would conflict with the need to adapt the
law to new cases and circumstances. To paraphrase Jeremy Bentham,
rigid adherence to precedent means acting without reason, to the
constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment, and not upon
legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to
reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
665 (1944). Lauterpacht, however, noted that in some domestic jurisdictions the
courts would reverse precedents "only if satisfied by the twin tests of clear error and
public mischief. ... legal position as laid down by the challenged precedent
decisively outweighs the injustice that may be created by disturbing settled
expectations based on an assumption of continuance of that position."
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 28, at 19-20.
43 See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 20, at 134.
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declared exclusion of reason, and thereby in declared opposition to
reason.4 4
Third, the courts need a way out of this conundrum- to
create the impression of legal certainty yet also be free from
precedential constraints. As Roscoe Pound put it, these are "the
conflicting demands of the need of stability and the need of
change."45
One way out of this conundrum is through various juristic
techniques for distinguishing previous cases. Courts thus create the
impression that new cases are perfectly consistent with previous
ones. This is not difficult to achieve due to the selection effect, which
makes sure that most cases that reach international courts require
analogical reasoning as opposed to precedential reasoning.
Additionally, international courts may point out that the proposition
asserted in the previous case is not ratio decidendi. Finally, the courts
can always openly depart from prior case law when distinguishing a
case proves unfeasible.
So in the end, what is the role of precedent? As this section
has shown, the power of precedent is its persuasiveness, much like
other legal rules. That is usually what lawyers mean when they say
that arguments based on precedent are merely forms of persuasion.46
Arguably, the Permanent Court meant something similar when it
said that the Court would not depart from "the previous judgments
the reasoning of which it still regards as sound."47
44 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 323 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
45 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (Harold Dexter Hazeltine
ed., 1923) ("Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking
about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability
and of the need of change.").
46 JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 240-241 (Richard W.
Nice ed., 1964).
47 Readaptation of Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 11, at 43 (Oct. 10). As Oppenheim's International Law puts it,
"the authority and persuasive power of judicial decisions may sometimes give them
greater significance than they enjoy formally." HERSCH LAUTHERPACT, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed., 1992)
(emphasis added).
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III. TREATIES
A. Univocalists vs. Skeptics
There are two basic views on the nature of treaties and the
function of rules of treaty interpretation: univocalist and skeptic.
These two schools are but a specific reflection of legal formalism
(positivism) and realism in treaty interpretation. In large part, these
divergent views are also due to different understandings of the
nature of the treaty.
1. Univocalists
Univocalist philosophy of treaty interpretation draws heavily
on general positivist hermeneutics. There are several conspicuous
elements of this positivist hermeneutics, including the beliefs that law
has a single and clear meaning; that the creation of law is the
legislative monopoly and written law is the real law; that judges
must look for the legislative intent; and that law is a complete system
and thus allows any interpretative method to be formalized by the
syllogism. 48
Accordingly, univocalists argue that rules of interpretation
permit only one correct answer. Thus, according to some theorists,
the purpose of interpretation is to "deduce the meaning exactly of
what has been consented to and agreed." 49 For univocalists, rules of
treaty interpretation will lead to the "correct" result, and even a
"single autonomous interpretation."5 0 As some scholars have pointed
out, this view imagines that an interpreter can arrive at a determinate
result "in a completely value-free way."5 '
48 ROBERT KOLB, INTERPRETATION ET CREATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL: ESQUISSE
D'UNE HERMENEUTIQUE JURIDIQUE MODERNE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
74-80 (2006).
49 ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (2008).
'0 See generally RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 6, 30 (2008).
Gardiner, however, points out that rules of interpretation "are not simple precepts
that can be applied to produce a scientifically verifiable result." Id. at 9.
51 ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
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2. Theoretical Skeptics
Interpretation skeptics, on the other hand, argue that rules of
treaty interpretation do not lead to one correct answer. Theoretical
skeptics base their position on some general systemic inadequacies of
international law. Leo Gross's theory of autointerpretation is perhaps
the best-known theoretical skepticism. Back in 1962, Gross observed
that:52
It is generally recognized that the root of unsatis-
factory situation in international law and relations is
the absence of an authority generally competent to
declare what the law is at any given time, how it
applies to a given situation or dispute, and what
appropriate sanction may be. In the absence of such
an authority, and failing agreement between the
states at variance on these points, each state has a
right to interpret the law, the right of auto-
interpretation, as it might be called. (...) This is, for
better or worse, the situation resulting from the
organizational insufficiency of international law.
One might argue that international courts precisely fill the
gap in that organizational insufficiency. In this context, it is
interesting to note that Gross made his point as a critique of Kelsen's
international legal theory, but even Kelsen himself, the greatest
European positivist of the twentieth century, did not argue that there
is one correct answer. On the contrary, he noted that from a logical
point of view, many meanings are equally possible; instead, his main
thrust was directed at the authoritative interpretation: "[TIhe
function of authentic interpretation is not to determine the true
OF TREATIES 4 (2007) ("In the view of the one-right-answer thesis ... [one] can
interpret a treaty by applying a number of legal rules and be perfectly certain of
always arriving at a determinate result in a completely value-free way. There is no
room for political judgment.").
52 LEO GROSS, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of
Autointerpretation, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 367, 386
(1984).
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meaning of the legal norm thus interpreted, but to render binding
one of several meanings of a legal norm, all equally possible from a
logical point of view."53 Therefore, international courts do make one
of the possible meanings binding, but it does not mean this is the
only possible correct answer.
3. Practical Skeptics
Like theoretical skeptics, practical skeptics doubt that a treaty
provision can have only one correct meaning. However, their skep-
ticism is based less on some overarching theory and more on brass
tracks of treaty making. Practical skeptics realize that treaties do not
always embody shared intentions of the parties. On the contrary, as
Philip Allott famously observed, "a treaty is a disagreement reduced
to writing" and it "is not the end of a process, but the beginning of
another process." 54
For a univocalist, treaties are written declarations of
intentions, they have a defined object, or at least their text has some
meaning, even if not natural. Yet, this assumption ignores actual
practice. Treaties do not always contain an agreement. They do not
always have a shared intention. Sometimes the provision of the treaty
has no meaning at all - it is a mere drafting error.
First, parties do not always agree on the meaning. Sometimes
they deliberately put a vague provision and expect that subsequent
practice will give some meaning to it. For a theorist, this sounds
impossible because it is "definitionally impossible for the parties to
have agreed on rendering the treaty not fully effective."55 But for a
practitioner, compromise can be more important than clarity; parties
may be unable to agree on their shared intentions, and so they
deliberately include some vague provisions. 56 Ambiguity is the basic
HANS KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at xv (1950).
54 Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 31, 43 (1999).
See also PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE
STATE 305 (2002).
5 ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 49, at 397.
56 Eileen Denza, Compromise and Clarity in International Drafting, in DRAFTING
LEGISLATION: A MODERN APPROACH 232 (Constantine A. Stefanou, and Helen
Xanthaki eds., 2008) ("If negotiation of a multilateral instrument had to await a
decision by all delegations that the wording was from their own individual
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"damage limitation" strategy of multilateral negotiation, and in its
basic form, it is simply achieved by making a text deliberately
ambiguous so that "different parties can read it differently."57
Second, a provision may have no meaning at all. It may be a
plain drafting error. One could expect some drafting errors in minor
treaties, but not meaningless provisions in major multilateral treaties.
Yet, one can find such example even in the ICJ Statute, which is an
integral part of the UN Charter; and the United Nations Charter,
according to many theorists, comes closest to the constitution of the
international community. Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute illustrates
this point.58 The article provides that the "jurisdiction of the Court
comprises ... all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations." The main problem with this provision is that the
Charter does not provide any matters which fall within compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.59 During the drafting phase, the negotiators
considered including several issues within the compulsory
jurisdiction; eventually, they could not agree, but they forgot to
delete the text. It only shows that drafting errors are ubiquitous not
only in domestic legislation,60 but in international treaties as well.
Third, in the drafting process of international agreements,
lawyers and other technical drafters are not prominent players. Most
agreements are negotiated by diplomats and other non-lawyers, who
could care less about rules of treaty interpretation or other formal
points. Thus, one observer pointed out that it is illusory to expect that
legalistic concerns figure prominently in negotiations:
perspective clear and unambiguous, the number of Treaties and other legally binding
international instruments adopted would be very small indeed.").
See, e.g., RONALD A. WALKER, MULTILATERAL CONFERENCES: PURPOSEFUL
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 190 (2004) ("[A]t times, you may find yourself
losing, and the emerging text not in accordance with your objectives. In those
circumstances ... to accommodate conflicting viewpoints, make the text somewhat
ambiguous, so that different parties can read it differently. From the point of view of
the defending party, this means that their position is not entirely overwhelmed.").
5 ICJ Article 38, supra note 11.
5 See generally Christian Tomuschat, Article 36, in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 589-687 (Andreas
Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tams,
and Tobias Thienel eds., 2006).
6o See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About
Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L.REv. 309, 310 (2001).
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Lawyers-if present at all during high-level
diplomatic negotiations- are usually treated as
subordinate to ministers and diplomats and not
invited or encouraged to raise 'legalistic' doubts as to
the meaning or acceptability of a compromise
brokered by politicians. 61
Accordingly, for practical skeptics it makes little sense to
interpret treaties according to rules of interpretation when
international legislators themselves pay no heed to them.
B. Schools of Treaty Interpretation
There have been three major schools of treaty interpretation.
Not all of them are mutually exclusive, but each of those emphasizes
one element over the over.
Teleological school, also known as "aims and objects", says
that the object of the treaty should be the guiding element.
Accordingly, intention of the parties and the wording of the treaty do
not matter as much as the ultimate aims that the treaty is supposed to
achieve. Before the adoption of Vienna Convention, this view had
been advocated most heavily by the so-called New Haven School.62
This approach perhaps has had as many critics as supporters.63 One
reason why it has been so controversial is that it is impossible to
implement it without a good dose of judicial activism.
Intentions school, also known as the founding fathers school,
emphasizes intention, or at least the presumed intentions of the
parties. The role of the judge is to discover these and give them their
effect. The problem of course is in discovery of these intentions.
6 Denza, supra note 56, at 232-233 ("The role and function of the draftsman is
generally more restricted in international conferences and councils than his role in
the preparation of national legislation.").
62 MYRES SMITH MCDOUGAL, HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL AND JAMES C. MILLER,
THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF
CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967).
63 See, e.g, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiator! Your Treaty
or Our "Interpretation" oflt, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1971).
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Traditionally, one way was to look at the travaux prtpatoire. Yet, in the
twentieth century, international negotiations became more
multifaceted, more protracted, and treaties went from bilateral or
plurilateral to multilateral. Because of these changes, travaux became
misleading and incomplete.
The textualists argue that the text of the treaty -usually
ordinary meaning of its terms -reveal best the meaning of the treaty.
According to this school, intentions may be relevant, but the best
indication of intentions is the final text of the treaty. This school has
also been the most popular among those who are concerned with
finding ways to limit judicial creativity. No doubt, it would be much
easier to ensure that courts only apply law, and not develop it, if the
courts had to apply treaties literally.
But strict textualism would also lead to absurd results, if
applied without common sense. As Judge Learned Hand remarked,
"there is no surer way to misread any document than to read it
literally." 64 The famous "Bologna law" example illustrates the
possible absurdity of this approach: according to the law of Bologna,
"whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the
utmost severity"; if it would be interpreted textually, one would have
to punish a surgeon "who opened the vein of a person that fell down
in the street in a fit."65 Moreover, as Judge Spender pointed out in the
Certain Expenses case, common sense is rather personal: "[w]hat
makes sense to one may not make sense to another. Ambiguity may
be hidden in the plainest and most simple of words even in their
natural and ordinary meaning." 66 However, if judges incorporate
some common sense, then strict textual interpretation is impossible
and judicial creativity inevitable.
64 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d. 608, 624 (1944) (Hand, J., concurring), quoted in
AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAw 274 (2007).
65 Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the
Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REv. 127, 127
(1994).
66 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 184 (July 20)
(separate opinion of Spender, J.).
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C. Rules of Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention
All schools of treaty interpretation have something to offer
and all have major drawbacks. Naturally, before the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted in 1969, and even
after its adoption, international lawyers questioned whether there
was a need for rules of treaty interpretation. One view, rooted in the
theory of legal realism, was that multiple rules of treaty
interpretation would contradict and cancel each other out, making it
preferable to have a few basic principles of treaty interpretation
rather than a false sense of certainty created by specific rules of
interpretation. 67 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who would later also serve
as a Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on the
Draft Vienna Convention, summarized the debate twenty years
before the adoption of the Vienna Convention:
[According to one view, it] would be better therefore to
rely on two or three basic general principles, and accept
the fact that in the last resort all interpretation must
consist in the exercise of common sense by the judge,
applied in good faith and with intelligence. . . . The
opponents of this view consider that it leaves too much
to the discretion of the judge, and point to the existence
of rules of interpretation in most systems of law, as being
necessary to ensure that decisions are given on reasoned
grounds of principle, and not arbitrarily. The practical
difficulties which may arise in the application of the rules
are, according to their view, due not to multiplicity or
contradictoriness, but to the absence of any definite
system establishing the order in which the rules should
be applied, and the relative weight to be given to each. 68
Eventually, the Vienna Convention seemed to have favored the
second approach. As the International Law Commission noted in its
6 See G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1, 2-3 (1951).
68 Id.
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commentary to the draft Vienna Convention, the Convention (Article
31) provided a single and general rule of treaty interpretation that
essentially combined the three schools of treaty interpretation. 69
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention embodied the core rules
of treaty interpretation. 70
For a realist-minded judge, the best thing about Article 31 is
that it is only a guideline. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice noted in the
above quoted passage, the proponents of specific rules want to solve
the problem of judicial discretion with rules that provide "the order
in which the rules should be applied, and the relative weight to be
69 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, (1966)
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 217-225, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add I
[hereinafter General Assembly Report].
70 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
"Article 31. General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as
an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Article 32. Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31,
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result, which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
Id
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given to each."7 ' While some scholars do think that the rules of the
Vienna Convention are fixed,72 this view contradicts both the practice
of international tribunals and the view of the International Law
Commission itself.73
Based on this, only theoretical extremists would argue that
two judges, even extremely like-minded judges, would arrive at the
same conclusions because of the treaty interpretation rules. However,
two judges, both using Article 31, can easily arrive at different
conclusions because one of them will give more weight to the text of
the treaty and the other will rely more on the object and purpose or
something else.
D. Beyond Vienna Convention
Even if the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation would
be constraining, which they are not, they still would not limit judicial
creativity. Many international and regional courts have shown a
willingness to openly depart from the Vienna Convention, or at least
renovate some of its elements.
For example, the International Court of Justice went beyond
the Vienna Convention (which was not in force at the time) with its
evolutionary interpretation: "an international instrument has to be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of interpretation." 74 The Appellate Body
of the WTO developed the principle of harmonious interpretation in
71 Fitzmaurice, supra note 67, at 3.
72 ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 49, at 309 (the rules of treaty interpretation are fixed
rules and do not permit the interpreter a free choice among interpretative methods).
73 See General Assembly Report, supra note 69 ("[T]he Commission confined itself
to trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few general principles which appear
to constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties .... It considered that the
article, when read as a whole, cannot properly be regarded as laying down a legal
hierarchy of norms for the interpretation of treaties. The elements of interpretation in
the article have in the nature of things to be arranged in some order. But it was
considerations of logic, not any obligatory legal hierarchy, which guided the
Commission in arriving at the arrangement proposed in the article.").
74 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
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which it kept in mind the aggregate results of interpretation and
considered its implications for the future of the treaty regime.75 The
European Court of Human Rights has discarded the ordinary
meaning interpretation in favor of the concept of autonomous
interpretation. 76
Various uncodified rules and canons of interpretation are
certainly not more constraining. For almost every uncodified canon
of interpretation one can easily find a dueling canon. Take, for
example, the famous principle of effectiveness - ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. According to this principle, when two possible
interpretations of a treaty exist, the court should prefer the one that
will make the treaty more effective.77 But then there is a "dueling"
canon - the principle of restrictive interpretation: "if the wording of
a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several admissible
interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations
for the Parties should be adopted."78 With some ingenuity, one could
find a dueling canon for every interpretative canon out there.
E. Summary: Rules of Treaty Interpretation as Constraint
This section has shown that, for the most part, rules of treaty
interpretation are elastic. Even if one could codify a general rule
which would provide "the order in which the rules should be
applied, and the relative weight to be given to each" -in essence an
algorithm for interpretation-creating a workable rule is still next to
impossible. Part of this idealistic quest to have mathematically
precise rules is due to misunderstanding of the nature of treaty
making. Many treaties do not have a legislative intent or a
75 See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE
BODY 275-305 (2009).
76 JOHN G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 71 (1993); George Letsas, Strasbourg's
Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 509,
523-527 (2010).
n Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in
the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 67-82 (1949).
7 Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier
Between Turkey and Iraq), 1925P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 25 (Nov. 21). See also
Lauterpacht, supra note 77, at 61-67.
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meaningful text. Mechanical application of precise interpretation
rules, even if there were such a thing, would often cause as much
damage as it is intended to avoid.
A more realistic view of treaty interpretation is that judicial
creativity is inevitable and constraint is unrealistic. Indeed,
interpretation and development of international law operate as a
"joint venture." 79 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht deftly pointed out that rules
of treaty interpretation usually serve only as a cloak for a decision
made on other grounds:
In a sense the controversy as to the justification of
rules of interpretation partakes of some degree of
artificiality inasmuch as it tends to exaggerate their
importance. For as a rule they are not the determining
cause of judicial decision, but the form in which the judge
cloaks a result arrived at by other means. It is elegant-
and it inspires confidence - to give the garb of an
established rule of interpretation to a conclusion
reached as to the meaning of a statute, of a contract,
or of a treaty. But it is a fallacy to assume that the
existence of these rules is a secure safeguard against
arbitrariness or partiality. 80
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Notion of Customary International Law
Legal rules derived from unwritten law-customary
international law-do not easily reveal themselves; instead, judges
must rely on ancillary rules for ascertaining customary international
law. But even the notion of customary international law is itself
evasive. In general, for customary law to be established, there must
be a general practice, which is widespread, consistent, etc. This
practice must be considered obligatory, meaning there must be some
sort of conviction that this practice is followed because it is
obligatory. The ICJ has on several occasions upheld the requirement
79 KOLB, supra note 48, at 931.
80 Lauterpacht, supra note 77, at 53 (emphasis added).
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for both elements: objective (practice) and subjective (opinio juris).
Thus, in the Continental Shelf case between Libya and Malta, the
Court stated that "[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual
practice and opinio juris of States..."8
These "simple" requirements in turn raise a number of other
issues. What is the density required for practice-how widespread,
how consistent, for how long, etc? What counts as practice-only
physical acts or also verbal acts, such as voting in international
conferences? What weight should be accorded to verbal acts if they
are recognized as the form of states practice? Practice of which State
organs counts-only organs responsible for foreign relations or all
State organs? Does practice of non-state actors count? What is the
nature of legal conviction or opiniojuris?
This is not a very promising introduction for legal rules that
should act as a constraint on judicial creativity of international courts.
As this section shows, rules derived from customary law can provide
a safe haven for all sorts of judicial innovation.
B. Objective Element: Vlhat Counts as Evidence of Practice?
First of all, a judge looking for a justification in customary
international law can choose which evidence to count as state
practice.82 It is widely accepted that state practice takes many forms.83
81 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29 (June 3).
82 See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Lav, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 3 (1974-75).
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reporter's note 2 (1987). International Law Commission in its report to the UN
General Assembly on "Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary
International Law More Readily Available" indicated the following non-exhaustive
list of evidence of customary law: texts of international instruments, decisions of
international courts, decisions of national courts, national legislation, diplomatic
correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and practice of international
organizations. Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International
Law More Readily Available, [1950] 2 Y.B. INTL L. COMM'N 367, U.N. Doc.
A/1316. (1950). Similarly, Brownlie indicates that the following are included among
the possible evidence of state practice: diplomatic correspondence, policy
statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on
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For one, there is some disagreement between authorities over
whether state practice includes verbal acts. On the one side, we find
authorities that assert that only physical acts count as state practice.84
Thus, in his separate opinion in Fisheries Case, Judge Read asserted
that "[ciustomary international law is the generalization of the
practice of States. This cannot be established by citing cases where
coastal States have made extensive claims . . . The only convincing
evidence of State practice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal
States asserts its sovereignty over the waters in question by arresting
a foreign ship . . . "85
One the other side, we find authorities that argue that verbal
acts do count as the evidence of practice. 86 Others yet take a middle
position and suggest including verbal acts, but also ascertaining
customary rules primarily "on real and concrete practice."8 7 In its
final report, the International Law Association's Committee on
Formation of Customary International Law also seemed to support
the middle position by emphasizing that one should take into
account the distinction between what conduct counts as State practice
and the weight to be given to it.
Of course, counting verbal acts as state practice opens the
door for using a great variety of materials, many of which will be
contradictory. The only "remedy" to this inconsistency is judicial
discretion. With so many sources of state practice to choose from,
every judge will be able to find something to his liking.
legal questions, e.g. manuals on military law, executive decisions and practices,
orders to naval forces, comments by governments on drafts produced by the
International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial
decisions, recital in treaties and other international instruments, etc. IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003).
84ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF SPECIAL CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 47-98 (1971).
85 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, U.K. v. Norway, Order, 1951 I.C.J. 117, 191 (Jan.
18) (separate opinion of Read, J.).
See, e.g., MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A
MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 20 (2 nd
ed., 1997).8 7 G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 91 (1993).
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C. Objective Element: Density
Another issue that helps judges ascertain favorable
customary rules is the required density of practice. In the
international community, consisting of roughly 200 States, it is often
difficult to establish a consistent practice. Wolfgang Friedmann
voiced his concern some 50 years ago when he noted that "custom is
too clumsy and slow" to accommodate the international community,
which went "from a small club of Western Powers to 120 or more
'sovereign' states."8 8 Normally, " [g]eneral customary international
law is created by State practice which is uniform, extensive, and
representative in character."89 However nice and laconic the
formulation of this rule, even radical formalists would admit that in
practice it is often unclear when the required density is reached.90
Moreover, there is no requirement of ideal consistency. The
ICJ clearly stated this point in the Nicaragua v. United States: "[t]he
Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous
conformity with the rule."91 Thus, some general consistency of state
practice will be enough for judges to "determine "the existence of a
customary rule.
88 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122
(1964).
89 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FORMATION
OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW - STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20
(London Conference, 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ILA Final Report on
Customary Law].
90 Mendelson's amusing example illustrates the difficulty: "It makes no more sense
to ask a member of a customary law society 'Exactly how many of you have to
participate in such-and-such a practice for it to become law' than it would to
approach a group of skinheads in the centre of The Hague and ask them, 'How many
of you had to start wearing a particular type of trousers for it to become the fashion -
and, indeed, de rigeur - for members of your group?"' MAURICE H. MENDELSON,
THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS
155, 174 (1998).
91 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27).
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D. Objective Element: Class of Subjects Who Form Customary
Rules
Another problem is that it is unclear whose practice is
relevant to the formation of customary law: is it limited only to
States, to States and international organizations, or to all subjects of
international law? This issue splits hairs of customary rule deter-
mination even further. First, conservatives argue that only State
practice is relevant to the formation of the customary international
law. The Third Restatement states that " [c]ustomary international
law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." 92 Other commentators
expressly stress the point that practice has to be attributable to States
and thus "the practice of international organizations or individuals is
excluded." 93
Second, there are those who maintain that States do not have
an exclusive competence in the formation of customary international
law, but the formation of customary international law should be
limited to States and international organizations.94 This is becoming
the new conventional view. 95
Finally, there are progressives -those who accord compe-
tence to form customary law to all participants in the international
community. Some suggest the inclusion of NGOs together with
international (intergovernmental) organizations. 96 Others suggest
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§102.2 (1987) (emphasis added).
VILLIGER, supra note 86, at 17.
94 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995).
95 Mendelson, supra note 90, at 188. Mendelson defines a rule of customary
international law as "one which emerges from, and is sustained by, the constant and
uniform practice of States and other subjects of international law, in their
international relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation
of similar conduct in the future." He further asserts the right of international
organizations in their own name to contribute to formation of customary law.
Mendelson further acknowledges that indirectly (but only indirectly, and not in their
own name) other entities-like NGOs or multinational corporations-may contribute
to formation of customary law. Id. at 201-03.
96 See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The
Challenge ofHuman Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1991).
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that this competence should be recognized in individuals,
particularly in the field of human rights.97 Once these views become
the official theory of customary international law any judge should
be able to easily synthesize dozens of different customary rules on
the same legal issue.
E. Subjective Element
Then there is the delicate issue of ascertaining the subjective
element, or opinio juris. Not every international usage or habit is
customary law; only a usage felt to be obligatory can be considered
customary law. Thus, opinio juris requires that there be "present a
feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of sanction will
. . . fall on the transgressor." 98 The subjective element, as the ICJ
stressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, is crucial because it
helps to distinguish customary legal rules from mere usages.99 In
inter-State relations, there are plenty of international acts that "are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any
sense of legal duty."10 0 For example, States habitually use red carpets
when greeting high-ranking foreign officials, but this habit is not part
of the customary law because States perform such acts without
conviction that they are legally obliged to do so. Thus, opinio juris
indicates the conviction of States that certain acts are performed
because they are obligatory or right.101
Of course, the tricky part is determining this conviction or
feeling that the usage is obligatory. Few judges, if any, are renowned
for their mind reading abilities, and reading the minds of abstract
entities such as States seems to be equally challenging. One way to
deduce opinio juris, as the ICJ indicated in Nicaragua case, "with all
97 Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation,
48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119 (2007); Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the
Creation of International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 127 (1937).
9 8 BRIERLY, supra note 12, at 59.
99 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
100 Id.
'0 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 47, at 27.
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due caution ... inter alia, [is from] the attitude of the Parties and the
attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions... "102
But this is in fact only one possible source of opinio juris and not the
method for deducing it. So in the end, each judge will decide for
herself or himself if state practice (in an international community
consisting of two hundred States), which is uniform, extensive, and
representative, deserves to be considered customary law because the
States showed "conviction" or "feeling" that this practice is
obligatory or right.
F. Summary: Customary Rules as Constraint
In the search for the justification of the preferred outcome,
only an unimaginative judge would be disappointed with customary
international law. Customary international law might have been easy
to ascertain when the international community was a small club of a
dozen States (primarily a family of Western nations), but as the
number of States multiplied, it has become next to impossible to
detect a perfectly consistent practice. Of course, there might be
exceptions, such as the prohibition of genocide or apartheid, where
few States if any will openly support such practices; yet even these
kinds of prohibitions may be occasionally honored more in their
breach than in their compliance.
Accordingly, one will rarely detect consistent practice, much
less consistent practice coupled with clear indications that it is
considered obligatory or right. Ultimately, which customary rules are
chosen for justification may depend entirely upon judicial discretion.
Therefore, the ascertainment of customary law often provides a guise
for judicial legislation.1 03 One could only add that customary
international law is arguably the best guise of all for judicial
creativity.104
102 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 91,
at 98-100.103 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 28, at 368.
104 In quantitative empirical studies of judicial decision-making, some scholars use
reliance on customary law as straightforward evidence of expansive interpretation of
international law. S6bastien Jodoin, Understanding the Behaviour of International
126 V. 20
DUELING CANNONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
This category of rules has the least potential to constrain
international courts, and perhaps there is not a single scholar who
would contest that. It suffers from similar haziness and perplexity as
customary international law does, only much more so. Suffice it to
mention that general principles of law were never intended to serve
as any sort of constraint, in a way that other rules might serve. Its
purpose was to fill the gaps in the international legal system left by
treaties and customary rules. Already in the drafting process of the
PCIJ Statute, some drafters opposed the inclusion of general
principles or equity into the Statute. It was not a representative of the
continental tradition but Lord Phillimore-a common law lawyer
who was much more accustomed to judicial law-making than his
continental counterparts. In his view, unless the English technical
meaning of equity was adopted, the inclusion of equity as a general
source of law would give the judge too much liberty.105
Less than a decade after the adoption of the Statute, Dionisio
Anzilotti, one of the leading international lawyers of his generation,
noted the very limited application of general principles of law.
According to Anzilotti, an international judge may derive a legal rule
from national legal systems, but that legal rule could be used only to
solve that particular case.106 Thus, Anzilotti did not believe that legal
rules derived from general principles of law could have a
constraining effect on future cases. Other scholars have likewise
observed that hunches, and nothing else, make judges choose which
general principles of law to use.107
Courts: An Examination of Decision-Making at the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 6 J. INT'L L. & INT'L RELATIONS 1, 20 (2010).
105 PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF
JURISTS, PROCES-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE 333 (1920).
1o6 DIoNIsio ANZILOTTI, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 107 (3a ed., 1928),
quoted in FABIAN 0. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 37 (2008).
107 Rudoff B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 734 (1957) ("But if we read the opinions,
we look in vain for an answer to the question: How did the Court know that the
particular rule or principle it relied on was in fact a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations? In case after case, the judge writing the opinion
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Overall, whatever the potential of general principles of law,108
constraint of international courts is not one of them.
VI. BEYOND LEGAL RULES
A. Inherent Ambiguity of Language
Early legal realists scoffed at the idea that judicial decision-
making is merely a rule-based activity. Rather, they argued that
multiplicity of legal rules and dueling cannons usually cancel each
other out and thus cannot constrain courts. Later, scholars in other
disciplines demonstrated the inherent ambiguity in language and the
impossibility of objectively correct answers -including objectively
correct legal answers. In the second half of the twentieth century,
many post-modernist philosophers and philosophers of law, most
notably deconstructualists such as Jacques Derrida, asserted that
language is inherently undecidable.109Accordingly, for Derrida and
other deconstructualists, there are no rules at all. This was perhaps
one of the most radical schools of thought in legal philosophy.
But even before deconstructualists and other post-modernists
gained prominence, argumentation scholars showed that arguments
of formal logic are impossible with natural language.110 Chaim
Pereleman, a noted Belgian rhetorician, demonstrated this idea when
he aimed to ressurect the classical Aristotelian notion of
argumentation which is opposed to Cartesian ideals of formal
logic.lllAccording to Perelman, only formal systems, which are
complete and have no internal contradictions, allow formal logical
simply expressed a hunch, a hunch probably based upon the legal system or systems
with which he happened to be familiar.").
108 See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
50-55 (1991); Elihu Lauterpacht, Equity, Evasion, Equivocation and Evolution,
Proc, 1978-79 PROC. AM. BRANCH INT'L LAW ASS'N 33.
'09 SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 231 (2009).
110 See, e.g., CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver transl., 1969);
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 188-200 (1958); see also Alain
Lempereur, Logic or Rhetoric in Law?, 5 ARGUMENTATION 283 (1991); Lyndel
Prott, Argumentation in International Law, 5 ARGUMENTATION 299 (1991).
" PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 110.
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arguments. 112 Mathematics is an example of such a system. An
important feature of formal systems is the principle of identity -one
proposition or symbol must refer to only one meaning. Language is
clearly not a formal system because it violates the principle of
identity -words do not stand for only one meaning, but rather have
multiple meanings. According to Perelman, in a formal system, the
following statement would make no sense: "A penny is a penny" or
"When I see everything I see, I think what I think."113 These
statements do, however, make sense because words are capable of
having more than one meaning. In the classical Aristotelian tradition
of argumentation, arguments do not exist in nothingness, their
acceptance depends on the particular audience. Thus, one audience
might reject the argument because it does not accept its premise,
while another audience may accept it without any reservations.114
In this sense, decisions of international courts are rarely more
objectively correct than their possible alternatives and it is therefore
impossible to "objectively" evaluate whether international courts are
performing well. Whether a judicial decision will be regarded as a
good one depends on a multitude of subjective factors. Hence,
judicial decisions are not objectively correct from the outset, but
instead become correct because a particular judicial audience accepts
them as such.
If a judicial decision seems "objectively correct" and
predictable, it is mainly due to the hindsight bias: looking back at
judicial decisions, legal scholars are ready to detect a coherent
development and predictable (but only in hindsight) outcomes. Yet, if
one looks at various opinions before the adoption of a particular
decision, the "objectively correct outcome" is much more difficult to
predict.
An example of this is South West Africa decision. There, the
ICJ refused to entertain a claim against South Africa for its apartheid
practices in South West Africa (Namibia).1 15 Subsequently, most
countries saw the Court as the pro-Western Court protecting
apartheid policies of South Africa. This decision caused a near
112 Id. at 1-47.
..3 Id at 217.
114 Id. at 26-45.
115 South West Africa (Eth. v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S.Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Jul. 18).
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universal boycott of the Court; and in hindsight, it is the best example
of an utterly senseless decision. Yet, at the time of the decision,
eminent lawyers considered it to be a perfectly correct decision. Sir
Francis Vallat stated that "in five or six years time it will be realized
that this Case was a great turning point because it (i.e. the Court) did
not give way to political pressure .. . [The Court] is not to be brown
beaten by political consideration."116 For every decision that history
eventually favored, one can find ample criticism at the time of its
adoption, and for every witless decision, one can find plenty of
praises before the tide of criticism turned the other way. It just serves
to show that the "objectively correct answer" is usually a product of
hindsight, not logical reasoning or an "objectively verifiable"
method.
B. External and Internal Constraints
As the previous sections have shown, legal rules cannot
constrain judicial creativity, but that does not automatically mean
that there are no constraints at all. The full treatment of this topic is
outside the scope of this article, but it is worthwhile to note the main
points here.
Historically, straightforward external constraints rarely
worked. For example, the English used several techniques to
minimize judicial latitude.11 7 First, the doctrine of stare decisis
required that courts rigidly adhere to precedents - by literally
following the holding of the previous case so that they could not
paraphrase it or loosen up its language. Second, the principle of
orality required judges to do everything in public. They had no
written pleadings to read, no staff, no secret deliberations -
everything had to be done in public. And because the public could
observe everything the judges were doing, they were unlikely to
legislate off the top of their head. Not surprisingly, the English
eventually abandoned both constraints.118
Likewise, in today's international courts, external constraints
are weak. For example, one empirical study of international judges,
116 See Higgins, supra note 3, at 67.
117 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 154--55.
118 Id.
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based on interviews with judges of most international courts,
revealed that judges themselves believe that institutional or external
constraints either do not exist or are rather weak. As one judge
observed, "[a]ccountable to God, is an old-fashioned way of putting
it."119 According to another judge, "[t]here is no check from the
outside; it's only from the inside." 120 Thus, it seems that collegiality
and deliberation might be overrated as the constraint.121 There is also
some empirical evidence from quantitative studies that external
interests influence judicial decisions of international courts only
when they are in line with the internal attitudes of the judges
themselves.122
Arguably, the most important constraints are internal, not
institutional or external. One internal constraint is the internalization
of the norms and usages of the judicial "game".123 This internaliza-
tion depends on many factors, with the professional background of
judges being one of the most important. For example, former
academics tend to be more activist as international judges, while
former diplomats tend to be more restrained and are more responsive
to national interests. 124 Other possible constraints, which may not be
purely internal, include concerns for reputation25 and reactivity (a
tendency to change behavior in reaction to evaluation or observation
by third parties).126 In this context, there is some merit to the views of
international courts as social systems, where the socialization of
119 DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO, AND LEIGH SWIGART, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE
THE WORLD'S CASES 205 (2007).
120id
121 This is not limited to international courts and probably is even more pronounced
in the American courts. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observations about
Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173 (1992) (observing that a judge usually states her
bottom line and sometimes a brief explanation; seldom judges change their minds in
the process of deliberations).
122 Jodoin, supra note 104, at 33.
123 POSNER, supra note 9, at 125.
124 TERRIS ET AL, supra note 119, at 64; Jodoin, supra note 104, at 30.
125 POSNER, supra note 9, at 125.
126 POSNER, supra note 9, at 149.
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international judges and legal staff influences judicial decision-
making.127
VII. CONCLUSIONS
International law is better qualified than common law
systems to be called inherently ambiguous. For one, international law
has no legislature, which is a prerequisite for all common law
systems. Also, there are little or no checks and balances on
international courts; even those that do exist are incomparable to the
checks and balances found in legal systems such as the United States.
As this article has shown, there is inherent ambiguity in
international legal rules. Furthermore, natural language generally
does not qualify as a formal logical system. Accordingly, such rules
are unlikely to constrain international judges who want to pursue
judicial law-making or make decisions on other grounds than legal
rules. Thus, an objectively correct legal result is a myth and "the
search for 'objective determination' is a chimera."128
Moreover, this article has discussed only what can be
described as "legal rules realism," or the juggling of legal rules and
cannons of interpretation in order to justify a decision that was made
on other grounds. However, "fact-finding realism" can also serve as a
safe haven for judicial creativity, allowing a judge to accept only that
evidence which will support the preferred outcome.129 Fact-finding in
international courts is much more fluid than in the majority of
domestic courts. Consequently, fact-finding realism would be
effective whenever judicial creativity confronts exceptionally clear-
cut legal rules.
127 Jodoin, supra note 104, at 31; see also Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court
and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING : NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 32 (Cornell W. Clayton
and Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
128 Higgins, supra note 3, at 71.
129 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 135 (1930) ("A judge, eager to
give a decision which will square with his sense of what is fair, but unwilling to
break with the traditional rules, will often view the evidence in such a way that the
'facts' reported by him, combined with those traditional rules, will justify the result
which he announces.").
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Does this then mean that legal rules are worthless and there
are no constraints on international courts? No. Only radical post-
modernist philosophers would argue so. Legal rules matter, a great
deal so in some cases, but they are only one factor out of many.
Pekelis probably expressed it best when he said that "concrete cases
cannot be decided by general propositions-nor without them."130
More importantly however, legal rules can operate as constraints
through internalization, and internal constraints can be more potent
than any institutional or external constraints, if those matter at all.
Of course, it would be wrong to think in binary terms about
the constraints of legal rules, i.e. that legal rules either constrain
totally or do not constrain at all. Instead, the question is one of scope
- how much they contrain. Even in public international law, where
ambiguity is the trademark of the legal system, international courts
will seldom make outlandish decisions. But as this article has shown,
international courts can easily find several equally plausible legal
rules applicable to a case. Which legal rule will carry the day will
likely depend on the preferred outcome, and the preferred outcome
will likely depend on policy preferences and other non-legalistic
grounds. 131
1o ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 20 (1950)
(quoted in Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the
Profession, 34 ROCKY MNTN. L. REV. 123, 131 (1961)).
See generally Higgins, supra note 3 (Policy reasoning in international law is less
welcomed than it is in the U.S. or a few other common law jurisdictions; that is why
international courts usually have to juggle legal rules to justify decisions that are
actually based on policy preferences).
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